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CHINA’S GLOBAL NAVY
Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy
James E. Fanell
 U.S. national-security leaders must assess the speed and sustainability of the national effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to deploy a global 
navy. In June 2018, I stood on the fantail of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
Navy (PLAN) guided-missile frigate Binzhou in the port of Kiel, Germany—and 
it was never clearer to me than at that moment that Beijing has the national will 
to dominate the seas.
Binzhou had been at sea for two and a half months patrolling the waters of the 
Gulf of Aden, as part of China’s antipiracy naval task force. Binzhou had transited 
the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Sea (with a refueling stop), and the 
English Channel and had sailed into the Baltic Sea. Moored among German and 
American warships, Binzhou stood out for its immaculate appearance. The ship’s 
officers, crew, and staff exuded confidence and preparedness to get under way—to 
sea, the place where they looked as if they belonged. This contrasted sharply with 
my recollections of a 2004 visit to the destroyer Luhu in Qingdao, as well as many 
subsequent visits aboard PLAN warships over the next fifteen years.
The visit to Binzhou crystallized for me that in the short space of a decade and 
a half I had witnessed the transformation of the PLAN from a timid, near-seas 
assembly of ships into a global naval force whose ships’ crewmembers were true 
mariners—as comfortable, confident, and capable as their German, British, and 
American counterparts. We are witnessing the beginning of a global PLAN—which, 
if left unchecked, will dominate the world’s oceans.
As recently as five years ago, the conventional wisdom held that the PRC’s 
leaders were focused primarily on “domestic concerns” of ensuring regime sur-
vival or accomplishing military modernization for regional purposes, to resolve 
territorial disputes within the so-called first island chain.1 Amid this all-too-
common failure to recognize the PRC’s true strategic intentions, the PRC has 
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continued to build a naval force that, if left unchallenged, not only will be sailing 
the seven seas but will be increasingly capable of achieving sea control in the 
global maritime commons, reaching that point as early as 2030, and potentially 
even the capability to achieve sea superiority by 2049.
After twenty years of transformation, the PLAN today operates around the 
world, from the Baltic (and soon even the Barents) to the South Pacific, and from 
the Arctic to the Antarctic. By 2015, it already was clear that China’s naval ship-
building would continue unabated through the third decade of the millennium, 
and that China’s leaders would move rapidly to increase the PLAN’s order of 
battle to support an expanding set of missions, so as to fulfill their “China Dream” 
of national rejuvenation and restoration.2 
While the evidence supports the assessment that “a massive expansion in the 
size of the PLA Navy” for the period 2015 to 2030 remains on track, there is one 
impediment in the strategic environment that could stymie the PRC’s maritime 
strategy: the Trump administration.3 For the first time in nearly fifty years of 
U.S.-PRC relations, America has an administration that has broken away from 
an unwritten, bipartisan “China policy” that promoted unconstrained engage-
ment and accommodation with the PRC. The Trump administration’s definitive 
decision to treat the PRC as a competitor may represent the only chance to stop 
the PRC from becoming the dominant global naval power over the course of the 
next two decades.
Yet, even given the extent to which the Trump administration has challenged 
Beijing’s global naval strategy, there remain significant practical tasks that must 
be completed if Washington is to disrupt Beijing’s designs successfully. If the 
Trump administration is not able to follow through with these practical actions 
to slow or disrupt the PRC’s global naval strategy, the world can expect to see a 
Chinese naval force that enjoys a global presence composed of multiple aircraft 
carrier and amphibious strike groups, a credible submarine-launched ballistic-
missile capability, an ever-present network of warships at sea around the globe 
24/7/365, and the concomitant influence and power this would provide to the 
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
THE PRC’S STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL MARITIME DOMINANCE
In 2013, President Xi Jinping unveiled his “China Dream” in a speech to the PRC’s 
National People’s Congress (NPC).4 The theme of the China Dream only has 
gained additional clarity over the ensuing seven years of President Xi’s rule. For 
instance, at the Nineteenth National Party Congress of the CCP in October 2017, 
Xi stated, “The theme of the Congress is: remain true to our original aspiration 
and keep our mission firmly in mind . . . and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese 
Dream of national rejuvenation.”5 
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The CCP’s “Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” includes the intention to 
“secure China’s status as a great power.”6 For Kevin Rudd, a former prime minister 
of Australia and acknowledged China aficionado, it means that “there now seems 
to be a new national and/or global vision that now sits above the simple maximi-
sation of national interests.” Mr. Rudd asserts that China has “become for the first 
time a multilateral diplomatic activist,” launching “initiatives of its own beyond 
its own immediate sphere of strategic interest here in the East Asian hemisphere 
. . . rather than declining to reach beyond its own narrowly defined core national 
interests as we have often seen in the past.”7 
While Rudd’s examination of the CCP’s 22–23 June 2018 Central Conference 
on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs focuses on the PRC’s diplomatic initiatives 
and activities outside East Asia, he also includes the following revealing observa-
tion: that “China has also developed naval bases in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and now 
Djibouti (the latter with some 5,000 troops based there), as well as participating 
in naval exercises with the Russians in the Sea of Japan, the Mediterranean, and 
even the Baltic.”8 While Rudd’s point may not be clear to all, he nonetheless is 
making the case not only that the PRC’s achievement of the China Dream is 
defined globally but that it will be supported by a global naval force—that of “a 
great maritime power.”
Insights into the PRC’s requirements for securing its status as a great mari-
time power were revealed during a 10 March 2019 press conference at a ses-
sion of the Thirteenth NPC in Beijing. This interview of the NPC’s Financial 
and Economic Committee vice-chairman, Yin Zhongqing, laid out a view that 
“the ocean is the cradle of life, the home of wind and rain, [and a] source of 
resources” and that “the ocean, deep sea, and polar regions could be developed 
and exploited.” Yin asserted that “strategically managing the ocean have [sic] 
become the necessary path for China to open up and develop new space, give 
birth to new economic industries, create new engines for growth, and build new 
shelters for sustainable development in the new period and new era.” In support 
of the goal of “accelerating the construction of China into a maritime power,” 
Yin pointed out “a huge neglect of efforts to move to the far seas, enter the deep 
sea, and move towards the oceans.”9 
Vice-Chairman Yin also indicated that the plan for developing the PRC into 
a marine economy and maritime power would include the goal of constructing 
“a multi-faceted system of maritime cooperation.” This would require that China 
“enter the deep ocean, move toward distant oceans until we reach Antarctica and 
the Arctic[,] . . . safeguard maritime rights and interests, and protect maritime 
security.” In other words, China would require a global naval force.10 
The expansiveness of the PRC’s intentions, capabilities, and operations has 
not gone unnoticed by the U.S. government. In December 2018, the Department 
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of Defense published its “Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s 
Expanding Global Access.” This unprecedented report points out that China has 
“expanded its military operations further from the Chinese mainland” and that 
it is “seek[ing] this presence based on its changing military focus and expand-
ing international economic interests, which are increasing demands for the PLA 
to operate in more distant maritime environments to protect Chinese citizens, 
investments, and critical sea lines of communication.”11 
The report goes on to state 
that the “PLA’s expanding 
global capabilities provide 
military options to observe or 
complicate adversary activi-
ties in the event of a conflict.” 
The report further points out 
that “China’s military strategy 
and ongoing PLA reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric 
mentality,” as “PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role, which they are 
actively implementing.” In general, these statements reflect the expansionism of 
the PRC over the past two decades. One only need imagine the future presence 
of the PLAN as the PRC continues to fulfill its grand vision for the hundredth 
anniversary of the founding of the PRC: a China that is a “prosperous, strong, 
democratic, civilized, harmonious, and beautiful modernized socialist strong 
country.”12 
Given this strategic context, it follows that this grand strategy is driving the 
PRC’s subordinate naval strategy, which governs “the guidelines and approach 
for planning and directing the overall construction and employment of the 
navy.”13 Starting with President Hu Jintao’s direction at the Eighteenth National 
Party Congress in November 2012 to “build China into a maritime power,” 
along with President Xi Jinping’s multiple calls to “step up efforts to build China 
into a strong maritime country,” the PRC has been transforming the PLAN 
from a near-seas fleet into a far-seas force—one that now is operating around 
much of the globe.14 
While in the past there has been debate, and in some circles even doubt, about 
whether the PRC has a naval strategy (or even a maritime strategy), it seems clear 
that any such debate is over. For instance, as mentioned in a Global Times article, 
a series of articles published in 2018 by the People’s Daily, an official newspaper 
of the Central Committee of the CCP, stated that “building China as a maritime 
power fits China’s development, the global trend, and is the necessary choice for 
realizing the Chinese Dream of the national rejuvenation. . . . [I]t’s about time 
to build a strong maritime country.” One of the authors of the three articles, Liu 
[T]he PRC has continued to build a naval  
force that, if left unchallenged, . . . will be in-
creasingly capable of achieving sea control in 
the global maritime commons, reaching that 
point as early as 2030, and potentially even the 
capability to achieve sea superiority by 2049.
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Jixian, former head of the PLA Academy of Military Science, said that “building 
a powerful maritime strength is the strategic mainstay of China’s development.” 
Further, Xu Guangyu, a retired major general and a senior adviser to the China 
Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told the Global Times that “these 
articles sent a clear message that China will invest more efforts in strengthening 
its ability to safeguard sea routes and overseas interests.” General Xu went on to 
state boldly, “There is no need to hide the ambition of the PLA Navy: to gain an 
ability like the U.S. Navy so that it can conduct different operations globally. . . . 
[C]onsidering that China has already become a global economic power, it is en-
tirely reasonable for China to boost its maritime power.”15 
Is the PLAN’s jettisoning of the previous “hiding and biding” strategy having 
an impact on its operations at sea? The simple answer is yes. The next section 
explores how the PLAN is operating internationally today, and where it is likely 
to grow in the following decades.
THE PLA NAVY: A GLOBAL PRESENCE TODAY
While official and unofficial statements assert the PRC’s global aspirations when 
it comes to the issue of maritime power, the reality behind those assertions is as-
sessed best by examining what the PLAN actually is doing at sea. In this regard, 
it is accurate to say that as of 2019 the PLAN now has an established track record 
of global naval operations. As noted in an August 2018 interview, Chief of Naval 
Operations Admiral John Richardson characterized the PLAN as a global force 
that is “both ‘ready and capable’ of operating wherever Beijing wants.” He even 
acknowledged that PLAN warships were operating in the North Atlantic.16 While 
this article will not cover every PLAN operation around the globe, it will provide 
a broad representation of the various PLAN warships and the missions that are 
being executed in support of the PRC’s stated goal of becoming a global maritime 
power.
A Decade of Antipiracy Naval-Escort Task-Force Operations
The first and most obvious place to start is with an examination of the past de-
cade’s worth of PLAN antipiracy naval-escort task-force operations in the Gulf of 
Aden. The first PLAN antipiracy task force, in December 2008, consisted “of the 
052B guided-missile frigate Wuhan (Hull 169), the 052C guided-missile destroy-
er Haikou (Hull 171), and the comprehensive supply ship Weishanhu (Hull 887) 
of the South China Sea Fleet,” which departed the port of Sanya on Hainan Island 
and sailed over six thousand nautical miles to waters off Somalia.17 As Erickson 
and Strange noted as early as 2013, these escort task-force deployments, while 
initially intended to “safeguard China’s economic interests,” over time have pro-
vided PRC and PLAN leaders with “irreplaceable naval training” and catalyzed 
“the development of naval skill sets often taken for granted but absolutely critical 
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for long-distance operations.” They now irrefutably portray Beijing’s emerging 
approach to “maritime governance as a great power.”18 
Since 2008, the PLAN has dispatched thirty-two escort task forces to the Gulf 
of Aden. Each task force has been composed of a three-ship configuration of two 
warships (consisting of various combinations of frigates, destroyers, or both) and 
an underway replenishment ship. In the first three years of these operations (or 
eight task groups), the PLAN relied on “ten domestic-made main battle ships 
and three supply ships” to fulfill these escort missions in the waters off Somalia.19 
However, from the deployment of the ninth task force in the summer of 2011, 
the PLAN began to expand the number and type of new platforms for these far-
seas missions. For instance, “the 054A guided-missile frigate Yulin (Hull 569), 
which had been commissioned for less than one and half years,” deployed with 
the ninth task force, and just two years later three of the very latest Type 903 
comprehensive resupply ships joined the PLAN escort task-force deployments. 
As the PLA Daily noted on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of these deploy-
ments in the summer of 2018, “the Chinese Navy is no longer worried about 
warship shortages. Not only were more warships built, the qualities had also been 
improved on a gradual basis. From the ‘Chinese Aegis’ to 10,000-ton destroyers, 
from a refitted Russian aircraft carrier to a new domestically manufactured air-
craft carrier, the Chinese Navy is transforming from a green-water navy into a 
robust blue-water navy.”20 
Another indicator of the PLAN’s global expansion came in 2010 when the fifth 
escort task force “did not return home directly after completing escort missions, 
but continued to visit countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania.”21 This 
demonstration of operational readiness following three months of escort duty in 
the Gulf of Aden marked the “globalization of the PLAN.”
This concept was expanded further in 2011 when the seventh task force dis-
patched the Type 054A / Jiangkai II–class guided-missile frigate Xuzhou (hull 
530) to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of PRC nationals 
from Libya. While the People’s Navy acknowledged the difficulties that FFG 530 
experienced in conducting this first-ever PRC foreign-soil NEO, by 2015 the 
PLAN’s NEO capabilities had improved markedly, as the nineteenth escort task 
force “confidently evacuated Chinese nationals from Yemen”—a first for the 
PLAN in a hostile threat environment.22 
Since 2011, the normal state of affairs has been two PLAN escort task forces 
under way in the region a majority of the time, with one task force conducting 
escort missions in the Gulf of Aden while the other conducts “goodwill,” or show-
the-flag, port visits in surrounding areas of the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and 
Mediterranean Sea, and even into the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This 
concept was highlighted, or “stress tested,” when the twentieth PLAN escort task 
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force conducted a five-month global circumnavigation in 2015.23 It is clear that 
in the short span of a single decade the PLAN went from being largely confined 
to the first island chain to having a global presence, with its escort task-force 
program having visited over sixty nations (see table 1).
What these examples of expanded geographic operations in the far seas dem-
onstrate is the ageless lesson that all seafaring nations learn about the capabilities 
and confidence that navies gain from being at sea. These data represent a trend 
line that foreshadows an expanding PLAN global presence, one that will continue 
to improve its combat readiness as each new area of the maritime commons is 
opened up to PRC influence.
While the PLAN has gained valuable experience from these years of merely 
plying the waters of the Gulf of Aden and other far seas at all, the PLAN has 
acknowledged that its improvements also are the “result of its new blue-navy 
strategy.” A key element of that strategy was the PLAN’s planning and devel-
opment of the two-task-force deployment system. This deployment system 
provides PLAN leadership the means to “easily handle any emergency,” insofar 
as is required at present.24 Given PRC leadership comments regarding its global 
agenda, it seems likely there will be an increase in the number of task-force 
deployments, especially as the size of the PLAN expands over the next twenty 
to thirty years.25 
One of the keys to the PLAN’s ten years of successful and expansive naval-
escort task-force operations has been the development of a robust underway re-
plenishment capability. During the first four and a half years of these operations, 
just three Type 903 supply ships (the so-called supply-ship troika) were used 
to resupply all the deploying PLAN warships. This obvious limitation required 
PLAN schedulers to keep one of these three resupply ships on station through 
two rotations of task-force deployments.
This era of the supply-ship troika finally ended when the supply ship Taihu 
(hull 889), the first Type 903A comprehensive supply ship, deployed with the 
fifteenth antipiracy task force in August 2013. Since then, the PLAN has built 
many more comprehensive resupply ships that have been able to support the 
two-task-force schedule with a dedicated resupply ship for each task-force de-
ployment. The increase in the number of fleet-replenishment ships has expanded 
the PLAN’s knowledge and training surrounding this very important capability, 
which serves as the backbone for all naval forces that aspire to conduct global 
naval operations. As noted in the People’s Daily, “the Type-903 series supply ships 
have greatly improved their replenishment efficiency and are able to conduct 
alongside, astern, vertical, and skin-to-skin connected replenishment-at-sea at 
the same time. Therefore, they can carry out underway replenishment missions 
under more complicated conditions.”26 
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And while the ships of the Type 903 series have enhanced the far-seas opera-
tions of the PLAN greatly, they no longer are the Chinese navy’s most advanced 
supply ships, as the first of the new Type 901 series / Fuyu-class large-scale resup-
ply ships came into service on 1 September 2017.27 The Type 901 is comparable 
in capability to the U.S. Navy’s forthcoming USNS John Lewis–class (T-AO 205) 
fleet oilers, which are set to replace the aging Henry J. Kaiser–class (T-AO 187) 
ships. The Fuyu-class replenishment ship is projected to be “a gas-turbine pow-
ered fast combat support ship that is designed to operate alongside an aircraft 
carrier strike group.”28 While as of May 2020 the new Type 901 series had yet to 
be deployed to the Gulf of Aden for escort task-force operations, its first overseas 
operations likely will come within the next year or two when the PLAN conducts 
its first aircraft carrier deployments into the far seas.
Not only have PLAN sailors deployed aboard their newest and latest 
type warships and learned how to navigate and maintain their ships far from 
home; PLAN leaders also have learned other valuable skills for maintaining 
command and control over their expanding fleet operations. The PLA Daily 
has noted that, “with the improvement of the Chinese Navy’s hardware, the 
escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia have become 
Task Force Numbers and Years Foreign Port Calls
Task forces 1–5
2009–10
Burma, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE)
Task forces 6–10
2011–12
Bahrain, Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kuwait,  
Mozambique, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand
Task forces 11–15
2012–14
Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, France, Israel, Kenya, Malta, 
Morocco, Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam
Task forces 16–20
2014–16
Angola, Britain, Cameroon, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, 
East Timor, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece (×2),  
Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, 
Sudan, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, USA
Task forces 21–25
2016–17
Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, UAE, Vanuatu, Vietnam
Task forces 26–30
2017–19
Algeria, Belgium, Britain, Cambodia, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Italy, Morocco, Philippines, Spain, Tunisia
TABLE 1
PLA NAVY ANTIPIRACY ESCORT TASK FORCE—FOREIGN PORT CALLS
Sources: Multiple, compiled by the author.
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training opportunities to sharpen the Chinese Navy’s software capacity.”29 Some 
of the software capacity improvements surely lie in the advanced weapons 
deployed aboard these task-group warships, but another improvement re-
lates to the PLAN’s ability to command and control its warships farther from 
China. For instance, according to the People’s Navy, the PLAN commander has 
conducted Lunar New Year video teleconferences (VTCs) with every task 
force (save one) since the fourth escort task force in 2010. These VTCs demon-
strate the PLAN’s commitment to maintaining a robust and global command-
and-control capability.30 
While the initial impetus for the PLAN escort task-force missions was to gain 
blue-water experience, PLAN leaders now recognize, and publicize, that these 
worldwide deployments have “become the vanguard to protect China’s interests 
overseas.”31 This past decade of far-seas operations foreshadows the PLAN’s in-
creasing ability to project power across the globe.
The real importance of the past decade of far-seas operations for the PLAN lies 
not just in the service’s ability to navigate and sustain the material readiness of its 
ships but in how those lessons are combined with the lessons the PLAN is learn-
ing through numerous war-at-sea naval exercises, held under real-world condi-
tions, routinely occurring along the PRC’s coast. For example, in early August 
2017 “the PLAN held a large-scale, multi-fleet live-fire exercise simultaneously 
in the Yellow Sea and Bo Hai, with naval ships, submarines, aircraft, and coastal 
defense units.”32 The combination of these near-seas live-fire naval exercises with 
the past decade of far-seas operations is transforming the PLAN into a global 
naval force that will be able to fight and win naval battles.
PLAN Aircraft Carriers
Beyond an examination of the PLAN’s current global operations, it is necessary to 
predict where the PLAN may operate with new platforms in the future. Perhaps 
no PLAN platform has received more attention than the aircraft carrier.
The most impressive display of PLAN power came in March 2018 when the ser-
vice’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (CV 16), was flanked by other PLAN warships 
and submarines in the South China Sea. President Xi Jinping attended what was 
described as the largest parade the PLAN had ever carried out, with forty-eight 
ships and seventy-six aircraft taking part.33 The state-run People’s Daily character-
ized the display as an “unprecedentedly” large-scale naval exercise—involving a 
flotilla as large as the one the Royal Navy dispatched to fight the Falklands War 
in 1982. The Chinese naval commentator noted that the exercise most likely was 
used to “test China’s aircraft carrier formation, gathering data and experience for 
the country’s future construction of carrier combat groups.”34 
More importantly, the exercise could be characterized as a coming-out for 
the PLAN’s power-projection capabilities. Uncharacteristically, the PRC press 
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boasted that “the Chinese navy will conduct even larger-scale drills in the 
future.”35 It even admitted a belief that to “be a world-class navy, the Chinese 
navy has the right to catch up” with navies of developed countries in terms of 
technology and scale, even beyond the PLAN’s recent advances. As a harbinger 
of the future, Chinese commentators highlighted that “the problem of a relatively 
small aggregate tonnage of naval vessels must be resolved, in order to increase the 
navy’s capability to confront naval hegemonies in the world.”36 
Following this unprecedented exercise, news of the PLAN’s aircraft carrier 
program continued to receive enormous attention. Shandong (CV 17), China’s 
first indigenously produced carrier, conducted three sea trials between March 
and November 2018. Follow-
ing the last sea trial of CV 
17, Xinhua reported that the 
PLAN’s third aircraft carrier 
was under construction, most 
likely at the Jiangnan Shipyard 
near Shanghai. While Chinese 
naval experts predicted the third carrier would take two and a half years to be 
launched, projections widely assert that this iteration will have a flat deck and 
some form of catapult launch capability.37 
Just how many aircraft carriers the PRC will build is a topic of great discus-
sion in the PRC press. In December 2018, the PLA Daily ran an article quoting 
two naval experts who assessed the PRC as needing at least five aircraft carriers, 
if not six, to fulfill “strategic shifts in the geo-political environment.” According 
to “China’s Military Strategy,” a white paper that the State Council’s Information 
Office released in 2015, these “strategic shifts” were implemented to refocus the 
PLAN from “offshore waters defense” to “open seas protection,” so as to “enhance 
its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattacks, maritime maneuvers, 
joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense, and support.”38 
What seems clear is that the boasting about future aspirations in March 2018 
was inspired by the speech President Xi delivered aboard one of the destroyers 
during the naval exercise. In his speech, President Xi stated that “building a 
world-class navy was part of his broader goal to ‘rejuvenate’ the nation.”39 Regard-
less of the rationale, given the scope and size of this event, the publicity about it, 
and the subsequent testing of the second carrier and rollout of the third carrier, 
there is little doubt the PRC still is expanding the size and scope of the PLAN 
aircraft carrier program.
According to some Chinese military experts, the PRC plans to have “at least 
six aircraft battle groups . . . in the water by 2035,” of which four “will be nuclear-
powered,” as it builds up its naval capability closer to that of the U.S. Navy.40 Thus, 
The combination of . . . near-seas live-fire na-
val exercises with the past decade of far-seas 
operations is transforming the PLAN into a 
global naval force that will be able to fight and 
win naval battles.
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given the PRC’s demonstrated efforts to be the “biggest” or “number one” across 
so many areas of national power, prudence requires that we prepare for a PLAN 
that has at least ten aircraft carriers by 2049—to match or surpass the capacity of 
the U.S. Navy.
Expanding PLAN Submarine Operations
Expert observers consider the expansion of PLAN submarine operations into the 
far seas to have begun in October 2006, when a Song-class diesel submarine was 
sighted within four nautical miles of USS Kitty Hawk.41 Between 2006 and 2013, 
PLAN submarine operations expanded into the South China Sea and Philippine 
Sea and became a normalized pattern of activity. Since 2013, “the PLAN has 
conducted regular deployments of nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean, 
and while submarines, especially nuclear-powered types, are suboptimal against 
pirates, they are a highly useful threat against India.”42 
The obvious question is where PLAN submarines will operate next. That 
question can be answered by paying attention to PRC oceanographic-research 
and survey operations. The PRC’s naval oceanography often is conducted “in 
tandem with, or under the guise of, scientific or commercial oceanography, but 
its real intent is to gain important data about the undersea domain, principally 
anything of benefit to the PLAN elite submarine force.”43 Wherever the PRC 
has carried out this ocean-floor mapping—in the East and South China Seas, 
the Philippine Sea, the western Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean—PLAN 
submarine operations have followed.
For example, in December 2018 it was reported that two PRC vessels desig-
nated “distant-ocean research fleet” ships, Kexue and Haice 3301, had entered 
Papua New Guinea’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and conducted operations 
involving “even spacing between legs.” Such activity is a clear indicator of bathy-
metric data collection that would support future PLAN submarine and submers-
ible operations.44 
With regard to the Atlantic Ocean, in 2018 “China’s new generation of 
ocean-going comprehensive scientific research ship Xiang Yang Hong 01 success-
fully completed China’s first global ocean comprehensive scientific examination 
task.”45 While Xiang Yang Hong 01 is subordinate to the Ministry of Natural 
Resources (MNR) and deploys to distant oceans as part of the PRC’s program 
to collect oceanic data, as Martinson and Dutton have noted, one of the main 
drivers for this data-collection program is to “support the development of 
China’s blue-water naval capabilities,” a function that is “especially important 
for undersea warfare.”46 Xiang Yang Hong 01 departed the port of Qingdao in 
August 2017 and deployed more than 38,000 nautical miles across the Indian 
and Atlantic Oceans and back into the Pacific before returning to its home port 
on 18 May 2018.47 Interestingly, Xiang Yang Hong 01 spent the month of October 
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Source: Greene, “Chinese Surveillance near PNG Expanding.”
2017 conducting oceanographic operations in the South Atlantic, the third leg of 
its circumnavigation of the globe.48 An article published in the November 2018 
issue of the Chinese Journal of Applied Oceanography suggests that the PLAN is 
laying the intellectual foundation for undersea warfare operations in the Atlantic 
Ocean. Specifically, the authors highlight the military significance of the work, 
stating that it “has practical value for exploiting seasonal variation in sound 
propagation in the Atlantic Ocean to engage in target detection.”49 This is a clear 
reference to future submarine operations.
In addition to the MNR’s fleet of nearly a dozen National Marine Research 
distant-ocean research vessels, the PLAN operates some nine distant-ocean 
survey ships that “perform bathymetric surveys” and collect oceanographic data. 
For instance, the PLAN’s Type 636A Shupang-class oceanographic research ship 
(designated AGS) Zhu Kezhen was reported to have conducted hydrographic 
survey operations in South Atlantic waters off Brazil in 2015. In addition to 
completing the East Sea Fleet’s first single-ship global circumnavigation, the mis-
sion of Zhu Kezhen was to conduct “an active exploration of understanding the 
ocean” in support of the PLAN’s role in transforming the PRC into a maritime 
power. Of particular interest, it was reported that Zhu Kezhen in recent years had 
been “focused on the strong military objectives, [and] innovated the all-weather 
survey and measurement model according to the requirements of ‘can fight and 
win the battle.’”50 
FIGURE 1
CHINESE RESEARCH SHIP OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
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Like the U.S. Navy, the PLAN “possesses a corps of meteorologists and ocean-
ographers” who support weather forecasting and hydrographic chart production. 
Most importantly, as Martinson and Dutton have noted, the “PLAN’s distant-
ocean survey fleet has more than tripled since 2015.”51 As Rear Admiral James V. 
P. Goldrick, RAN (Ret.), former head of Australia’s Border Protection Command, 
has observed, the Chinese mapping of the world’s oceans is now on the same scale 
as Soviet maritime operations during the height of the Cold War.52 Given the 
previous pattern of MNR and PLAN oceanographic operations preceding PLAN 
submarine operations, we should prepare for Chinese submarine operations in 
the Atlantic over the course of the next decade, and most certainly by 2030.
This is to say nothing of PLAN submarine operations in the Pacific over 
the past decade. One need only recall Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy’s 2015 
testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, that the PLAN’s 
submarine force was expanding its geographic area of operations as well as the 
duration of subs’ deployments. Extrapolating from Indian Ocean operations, 
Admiral Mulloy noted that in 2015 one PLAN submarine had been deployed 
for ninety-five days.53 Given the global nature of the PLAN’s expansion, it is not 
unreasonable for USN leaders to expect to see PLAN submarines operating in 
Hawaiian waters; if they are not doing so already, they surely will within the next 
five years. We also should expect to see PLAN submarines operating off the U.S. 
West Coast by 2030.
As for the number of PLAN submarines that can be expected in the future, in 
2015 Scott Cheney-Peters and I estimated that by 2030 the PLAN would have twelve 
nuclear-powered attack submarines (designated SSNs), twelve nuclear-powered 
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), and seventy-five air-independent-propulsion 
(i.e., AIP) and diesel attack submarines (SSPs/SSs).54 However, given recent devel-
opments regarding a possible new nuclear submarine–production facility under 
the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Company (BSHIC) in Huludao, the num-
ber of PLAN SSNs and SSBNs may be greater than originally estimated.
According to analysis of Google Earth commercial-satellite imagery of land 
reclamation at BSHIC since 2014, a collection of large foundations and build-
ings—including “a main assembly hall, a pressurized hull production shop, a 
paint shop, and a number of transport rails”—could be China’s newest nuclear 
submarine–production facility. While the commercial imagery has “prompted 
some Chinese military enthusiasts to compare it with interiors of other nuclear 
production halls around the world,” others remain unconvinced.55 The case 
against this facility being a new nuclear submarine–production hall is based on 
two arguments: one, the existence of a concrete wall blocking the dual rail lines 
from the construction halls to the dry dock; and two, doubt about the thickness 
of the concrete slabs in the new halls and whether they have the load-bearing 
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/4
 2 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
capacity for SSNs or SSBNs. With regard to the first issue—the wall blocking 
the rail line to the dry dock—commercial imagery since mid-2017 clearly in-
dicates that the concrete wall has been removed. Now the dual rail lines from 
the production halls to the dry dock are unobstructed, thereby allowing any 
newly produced SSN or SSBN to reach the waters of the Bo Hai. As for the 
thickness of the concrete slabs and their load-bearing capability, the argument 
is unconvincing, as the resolution of the commercial imagery is insufficient to 
determine the matter.
Given the existence of this new facility, its internal configuration, and its es-
timated production capacity, such “an arrangement, once mature and properly 
organized with efficient pre-assembly module fabrication, may enable two SSNs 
and one SSBN to be launched every year.” If such a rate of production were to 
begin in 2020, the PLAN could have as many as twenty-four SSNs and fourteen 
SSBNs by 2030. While some may scoff at this projection, it is worth remember-
ing that as recently as a decade ago similar doubts existed regarding Chinese 
destroyer production—but in 2018 alone the PRC launched seven new destroyers 
(three Type 055s and four Type 052Ds).56 
Intelligence Collection
Another mission area in which the PLAN has been operating in the far 
seas is intelligence collection. Beginning in 2012, the PLAN has dispatched 
intelligence-collection ships (designated auxiliary general intelligence vessels 
[AGIs]) to the waters off Hawaii during the biennial USN-sponsored Rim of the 
Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. While the PRC was not a participant in RIMPAC 
2012, that did not prevent it from sending an AGI. The PLAN again dispatched 
an AGI to the waters off Hawaii during RIMPAC 2014, even though the PLAN 
was invited formally and participated with four ships. The PLAN did not send 
an AGI to RIMPAC 2016, in which it again was a formal exercise participant. 
However, during RIMPAC 2018, to which the PLAN was not invited, a PLAN 
Type 815 Dongdiao-class AGI did show up off the coast of Hawaii, according 
to the U.S. Pacific Fleet.57 
PLAN AGI collection operations have targeted other U.S. naval exercises and 
operations. For instance, in 2014 the PLAN dispatched a Dongdiao-class AGI 
to spy on the U.S. Seventh Fleet–led Exercise VALIANT SHIELD in the waters off 
Guam.58 Then, according to the Pentagon, in July 2017 the PLAN dispatched 
another Dongdiao-class AGI, this time to collect intelligence against the U.S. 
missile-defense test of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system (referred 
to as THAAD).59 Coincidentally, this occurred as yet another PLAN Dongdiao-
class AGI was detected within the Australian EEZ near Queensland, where U.S. 
and Royal Australian Navy warships and aircraft were conducting Exercise TAL-
ISMAN SABER.60
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The PLAN’s AGI operations over the last several years have not confined 
themselves to collection missions against the United States and its allies. In 2018, 
in a first, the Russian Federation invited the PLA to participate in the strategic 
VOSTOK exercise, billed as the largest exercise in modern Russian history. Sergey 
Shoygu, the Russian defense minister, was quoted as saying that “about 300,000 
troops, more than 1,000 planes, helicopters, and drones, up to 80 combat and 
logistic ships and up to 36,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers and other ve-
hicles” were involved in the exercise. Of the personnel, 3,500 were PLA soldiers 
dedicated to the ground portion of the exercise.61 
Remarkably, as has been the PRC’s pattern at RIMPAC exercises, a PLAN 
Dongdiao-class AGI was dispatched to shadow “Russian Navy assets for the 
length of the at-sea portion of the exercise while Chinese and Mongolian troops 
exercised ashore,” according 
to U.S. officials.62 Interest-
ingly, there was no reported 
presence of other PLAN war-
ships in support of the VOS-
TOK 2018 exercise.
Despite AGIs being some of the most vulnerable platforms in any war-at-sea 
scenario, the increasing presence of PLAN AGIs around the world provides the 
PRC another layer of collection in its expanding maritime-intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance architecture. The function they perform should be rec-
ognized as another important element in the PLAN’s overall global naval strategy.
Another aspect of intelligence collection that could generate future PLAN ac-
tivity relates to international underwater cables, which are very important for the 
amounts of information they carry. In this regard, it is worth noting the PLAN’s 
activities in the islands of the South Pacific, particularly around Fiji. In December 
2018, a “China-aided” hydrographic survey ship was handed over to the Fijian 
navy. The ship, Kacau (named for a Fijian seabird), is reported to be “equipped 
with high-tech equipment for hydro detection” for carrying out “hydrographic 
and maritime surveys, providing detection data and real-time information.”63 
An eighteen-member PLAN training team spent four months training the Fijian 
crewmembers of Kacau. The Fijian minister for defense, national security, and 
foreign affairs noted that the ship would provide “a range of operational capabili-
ty, which is not limited to hydrographic survey but maritime surveillance, HADR 
[humanitarian assistance / disaster relief], diving, [and] Search and Rescue.”64 
Given China’s previous efforts to establish underwater-surveillance networks, 
it is reasonable to expect that the hydrographic data the Fijian vessel generates 
may be shared with China and processed by Chinese institutes, adding to China’s 
undersea-domain databases.65 Further, this gift may open the door for joint-venture 
When it comes to the very important metric 
of how many ships actually are being built, 
launched, and commissioned, the PLAN con-
tinues to surpass the U.S. Navy.
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FIGURE 2
UNDERSEA CABLES CONNECTING AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND TO THE INTERNET
Source: CerCis Consulting, cercisconsulting.com/.
hydrographic expeditions that will include this ship and deployed Chinese re-
search vessels, possibly including among the latter the 6,000- and 7,000-meter-
class submersibles and their associated support ships. In a worst-case scenario, 
this knowledge and access would allow the PRC to isolate both Australia and New 
Zealand from receiving U.S. intelligence and communications. This is something 
that bears close monitoring by the United States, and close coordination with 
Australia and New Zealand.
Hospital Ship
As the lead element of its psychological operations, the PLAN operates its Type 
920 / Anwei-class hospital ship Peace Ark (AH 866) globally. The PLAN deployed 
Peace Ark on a 205-day around-the-world deployment, publicized as “Mission 
Harmony–2018.” The PRC press reported that Peace Ark’s “goodwill” voyage ex-
tended over 31,800 nautical miles and provided medical services during foreign 
port calls in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Venezuela, Ecuador, the 
Commonwealth of Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Dominican Repub-
lic.66 During the port call in Ecuador, the chief of the mission noted that Peace Ark 
had visited over forty-two nations since it was launched in 2008 and had treated 
nearly a quarter of a million patients.67 
But in addition to showing the flag and providing medical services, the officers 
and sailors of Peace Ark gained invaluable training and experience in operating 
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at sea around the globe, as well as learning about foreign ports and the navies in 
each nation. While it may seem counterintuitive, even a hospital ship deployment 
provides—albeit in the smallest of ways—the kind of experience that contributes 
to the PLAN’s overall combat readiness on a global scale.
Participation in Foreign Naval Exercises
One of the drivers of the PLAN’s global expansionism is the clear and unambiguous 
benefit it obtains from participating in naval exercises with foreign navies. Despite 
assertions to the contrary by some in the “China hands” community, the PLAN 
gained valuable insight into naval warfare from its participation in RIMPACs 2014 
and 2016. While the activities involved seemingly were innocuous, the PRC press 
noted that the PLAN participated in “cannon firing exercises, comprehensive ex-
ercises, maritime security actions, maritime warship exercises, military medicine 
exchanges, humanitarian aid, and disaster reduction, as well as diving drills.”68 
Participation in these activities clearly provided the service with an unprecedented 
intelligence windfall that ultimately threatens USN operational security, so disinvit-
ing the PLAN from participating, as of RIMPAC 2018, was long overdue.
Likewise, the PLAN has conducted joint naval-warfare exercises, named JOINT 
SEA by the PRC, with the Russian navy since 2012. Since then the scope, scale, 
and complexity of this exercise series have expanded. Each year the PLAN has 
dispatched its warships to the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Mediterranean 
and Baltic Seas.69 The most recent iteration of the exercise, JOINT SEA–2019, was 
conducted from 29 April to 4 May, and focused on joint sea defense.70 The exer-
cise involved Chinese aircraft and submarines and Russian submarines engaging 
in joint maneuvering episodes, organized communications, rocket practice, and 
engagement of sea and air targets with artillery fire.71 
Not only did this experience catch the attention of U.S. military and intel-
ligence communities, but it was observed by allies, including Norway. In Febru-
ary 2019, Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde, Norway’s chief of military 
intelligence, highlighted Chinese and Russian Arctic cooperation in his annual 
report. The unprecedented statement declared that “in the long term, we must be 
prepared for a clearer Chinese presence also in our neighboring areas.” General 
Haga Lunde went on to assess that “such development is in line with President 
Xi’s goal to develop the military as part of the country’s superpower ambitions. 
Beijing will to a larger extent use military power as a tool in its foreign policy.” 
Lending credence to the Norwegian assessment, in 2018 Vice Admiral Shen 
Jinlong, the commander of the Chinese navy, visited Severomorsk, the Russian 
Northern Fleet headquarters north of Murmansk on the Barents Sea coast.72 
While the PLAN never has conducted military voyages to Arctic waters, this 
likely will change soon, given that in January 2019 the PRC conceptually laid 
out a so-called Polar Silk Road in a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy.”73 
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Future PRC Naval Operating Areas:  
The Belt and Road Initiative and the PLA Navy
One obvious indicator of future PLAN operations is a direct link to the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). That concept first was presented in 2013 under the banner 
of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road during 
President Xi’s visits to Central and Southeast Asia.74 Then in 2015, President 
Xi unveiled “the principles, framework, and cooperation priorities and mecha-
nisms” of what was renamed the Belt and Road Initiative, which, according to 
the PRC, was designed “to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a brighter 
future together.”75 
The importance of the BRI to the PRC’s future can be found in the January 
2019 report from China’s Ministry of Commerce, which announced that the 
trade volume between China and countries along the BRI totaled $1.3 trillion in 
2018, up 16.3 percent from the year prior.76 Not only does the BRI involve sub-
stantial amounts of money deployed to buy access and influence; it also serves 
to satisfy the PRC’s mercantilist designs to control markets, supply chains, and 
access to the resources needed to control global economic development.
The Pentagon has taken note of how the PRC is using the BRI “to develop 
strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with Chi-
na’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues.”77 
In keeping with that view, the world has witnessed the PLAN expand its opera-
tions into the far seas in parallel with the BRI’s expansion throughout the Indo-
Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas over the past six years.
In its “Vision of Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative” 
white paper, released in 2017, the PRC describes three maritime corridors and 
their importance to maritime-security cooperation. The first corridor runs from 
China through the Indian Ocean to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea; the sec-
ond runs from China to Oceania and the South Pacific; while the third transits 
northward from China to Europe through the Arctic.78 By providing the PLAN 
with access to various foreign ports, the BRI has created advantages for the naval 
service that have allowed it to extend its operations around the globe. The United 
States—notably and purposefully—is not included in the BRI; in the future this 
could isolate us, leave us in a weak negotiating position, or otherwise bring 
pressure to bear on us. However, neither option—being part of the BRI or being 
excluded from it—is good for the United States; instead, we should continue to 
resist the BRI entirely, not least for the naval advantages it grants to China.
So, where might we find the PLA operating in the future, as the BRI contin-
ues to expand? The answer to that question became clearer when President Xi 
conducted a three-nation visit to Europe in March 2019. On 23 March, it was 
announced that Italy had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
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with the PRC, making it the first member of the Group of Seven industrial-
ized nations to join the BRI. The agreement, ostensibly worth $2.4 billion, has 
the potential to balloon to $22.4 billion, according to the Italian deputy prime 
minister (although these numbers should be considered with great skepticism, 
given that other announced billions of dollars in BRI investments have not ma-
terialized). But the compromising concessions that are front-loaded into such 
agreements are very real. In the case of Italy, they include the state-owned China 
Communications Construction Company (CCCC) signing two cooperation 
agreements, with the authori-
ties of the port of Trieste and 
with the commissioner su-
pervising the reconstruction 
of the bridge in Genoa that 
collapsed in the summer of 
2018.79 While it is not clear 
whether the MOU would 
cover the port of Genoa project, the Italian press reported that Italian port au-
thorities are preparing to set up a new company with CCCC to operate “major 
works related to the port of Genoa.”80 
Purportedly, the importance of this agreement to China is in relation to the 
BRI, in that it “will allow it to build more ports that can handle large-scale con-
tainer ships.”81 Yet even the mayor of Trieste acknowledged that, while the city 
had much to gain from the agreement, “the Chinese had even more to gain from 
his port’s deep harbors.”82 It should be anticipated that, as with other BRI port 
projects, as the BRI expands into Trieste, Ravenna, and Genoa, PLAN warships 
will follow. Ultimately, the PRC’s expanding access to ports in Europe offers the 
PLAN more opportunities to resupply its forces, potentially even during a mari-
time conflict in other areas.
The linkage between the expansion of BRI projects and investment in and 
acquisition of ports has been the topic of much analysis recently, most notably 
by Thorne and Spevack, who assert that the BRI provides Beijing with “access to 
vital sea lines of communication.” Port investments are being used as “vehicles” 
whereby the PRC can “build dual-use infrastructure to facilitate Beijing’s long-
range naval operations.”83 Likewise, O’Dea postulates that expansion by the 
China COSCO Shipping Corporation (COSCO) is a “distinctly Chinese approach 
to maritime development,” and that this “state-owned shipping company has 
become the flagship of China’s ambition to become a global maritime power.”84 
This expansion has not been limited to Europe, Africa, and Southeast and 
South Asia. For instance, in February 2019 it was reported that the Peruvian port 
of Chancay would join COSCO under the auspices of the BRI. The $225 million 
[T]his global naval presence will result in 
exactly what the world has witnessed in the 
South and East China Seas over the past 
decade, where PLAN forces have been used to 
bully and intimidate smaller and weaker na-
tions into complying with Beijing’s dictates.
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agreement was reported to be COSCO’s first port purchase in South America, 
one that will provide deepwater (sixteen meters) access. Plans have been an-
nounced to build a new terminal at the port.85 
Not all of the PRC’s port expansion is controlled by COSCO. For example, 
in March 2019 came the formal announcement that Namibia’s new container 
terminal in the coastal town of Walvis Bay—originally projected to be com-
missioned on 1 August 2019—was constructed by China Harbour Engineering 
Company. Following a $300 million funding grant from the African Develop-
ment Bank, construction work began in 2014 on forty hectares of land re-
claimed from the sea.86 The terminal will more than double the cargo-volume 
capacity of the port—and undoubtedly will provide the PLAN with an access 
port on the Atlantic.
Even as the number of separate, specific cases in which the PRC has gained 
access to foreign ports continues to grow, O’Dea already has provided the con-
clusive summation of the overall impact of this strategy. “By creating a global 
port network for ostensibly commercial purposes, China has gained the ability 
to project power through the increased physical presence of its naval vessels—
turning the oceans that historically have protected the United States from foreign 
threats into a venue in which China can challenge U.S. interests.”87 
CONTROL OF RESOURCES
One of the most sensitive factors relevant to the BRI and the future of PLAN 
global expansionism is the PRC’s dependency on imported oil. As the Global 
Times has reported, the PRC’s oil consumption is rising faster than its ability to 
import crude oil. For example, in 2018 the PRC consumed 648 million tons of 
oil, of which 460 million tons was imported, meaning the PRC’s dependency on 
foreign crude was at 70 percent for the year—a clear strategic vulnerability for 
the CCP. The PRC’s “domestic oil fields have generally reached the limits of their 
oil production capacity,” and it is unlikely there will be any significant increase 
in domestic production. This directly impacts the PRC’s strategic petroleum 
reserve (SPR), estimated at forty to fifty days’ worth, given the increasing rate of 
consumption each year, despite Beijing’s efforts to curtail energy consumption 
and find alternative sources.88 International norms are for nations to have at least 
a ninety-day SPR, so it seems likely the PRC will become increasingly concerned 
about its ability to maintain access to oil sources around the globe. This contrib-
utes to the drive for the PLAN to expand globally.
With regard to petroleum, it is worth noting that in January 2019 the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced a major new oil dis-
covery off Aberdeen, Scotland. CNOOC Petroleum Europe, a wholly owned 
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subsidiary of CNOOC, holds a 50 percent interest in the operating license.89 
While deployments of PLAN warships to the waters off Scotland may not be 
imminent, this discovery creates another area of attention related to the PRC’s 
vulnerable SPR situation, and marks a locale where the PLAN may operate in 
the future.
Protecting and Controlling the Diaspora
As noted previously, the list of factors driving the PLAN’s increasing global 
presence includes the top-down determination of Chairman Xi Jinping to make 
China a maritime power, supporting the BRI, increasing participation in naval 
exercises around the globe, and achieving energy security. But another area re-
lates to protecting Chinese citizens and controlling Chinese resources around the 
globe, and the extraterritorial projection of Chinese law internationally.
As noted in a January 2019 Center for Naval Analyses study, the mission of 
defending Chinese people and assets abroad is one of the major factors in the 
PLAN’s expansive presence throughout the Middle East and the western Indian 
Ocean. The authors of the study state that “the number of Chinese citizens and 
investments in the region has grown considerably,” and that the PLAN, in par-
ticular, “has been given a mandate to protect those interests.”90 While the PLAN 
has conducted NEOs in Libya and Yemen, some indicators suggest that conflicts 
on the horizon potentially involving the safety of Chinese nationals could bring 
the PLAN into action even in the Americas.
For example, in the South Atlantic in February 2018, an “Argentine coast 
guard vessel fired shots at a Chinese fishing vessel that was allegedly operating 
in Argentina’s EEZ without authorization.” This incident occurred after the 
Argentine forces had pursued the poachers for eight hours. Interestingly, the 
fishing vessel was not alone and evaded capture by the Argentine navy with 
the help of four other Chinese ships.91 This was not an isolated incident, as a 
year later, in February 2019, a Chinese “squid jigger” fishing vessel sank after it 
collided with a Spanish trawler.92 According to the Argentine coast guard, the 
Chinese squid jigger, Hua Xiang 801, “was detected illegally operating in mile 
199 of Argentina’s EEZ, and was ordered to stop engines and prepare for board-
ing by the patrol vessel.” In a video provided by the Argentine coast guard, 
Hua Xiang 801 was “not operating its satellite Automatic Identification System, 
AIS, ignored repeatedly radio warnings and before escaping with all lights off 
tried on several occasions to ram the Argentine patrol.”93 While collisions at 
sea between fishermen are not uncommon, given the PRC’s hypernationalistic 
sensitivities to international slights and “loss of face,” it is entirely possible that 
in the future Beijing may call on the PLAN to provide long-range support to 
Chinese fishing fleets in the South Atlantic.
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As China’s naval dominance increases, we also should expect and prepare for 
increasing attempts by China to extend its extraterritorial laws from Chinese 
citizens to citizens of other countries. We already have seen this in the case of 
people who are citizens of countries such as Australia and Sweden but of Chinese 
ethnicity.94 We also are likely to see this approach imposed against any ethnicity 
in the future, as it was against Canadians after the Huawei dispute.95 
Diplomacy Drives PLAN Expansionism
Not only does the PRC’s mercantilist quest for resources, via the BRI, provide an 
impetus for PLAN expansion; so too does international diplomacy. For instance, 
another place where we might see an increase in PLAN warship port calls is El 
Salvador.
The country officially cut ties with Taipei and established a formal strategic 
alliance with Beijing in August 2018. Just a month before the official recogni-
tion of the PRC, Luz Estrella Rodríguez, El Salvador’s economy minister, stated 
that Beijing was interested in reviving the commercial port of La Unión in El 
Salvador’s east, which “has remained largely deserted since it was completed in 
2008 because its lack of maritime traffic has made it difficult to find investors.” 
This concatenation of events led the American ambassador to El Salvador, Jean 
E. Manes, to warn publicly of the PRC’s intentions to turn the commercial port 
into a “military base.”96 
The Pursuit and Sustainment of a Global PLAN
Since the PLAN’s expanded global naval capabilities and operations are linked 
firmly to President Xi’s “China Dream,” and since the PRC has not yet achieved 
its end state of becoming a “modern socialist country,” we should expect that 
over the next twenty years the PRC’s naval shipbuilders will sustain, or increase 
as required, the pace of shipbuilding needed to achieve the goal of “building a 
powerful military in the new era.”97 While predicting the future with precision 
remains a difficult endeavor, given the trajectory of PRC naval construction over 
the past twenty years, the following three assertions in favor of a robust Chinese 
naval shipbuilding program have remained firmly in place since this author first 
listed them in 2016.98 
First, the Chinese government will have the desire and ability to continue to 
increase in real terms its investment in its shipbuilding for naval forces; second, 
China will continue to enjoy cost advantages in its shipbuilding compared with 
foreign naval shipyards; and third, Chinese shipbuilders will continue the trend 
of indigenous technical mastery of complex designs and systems integration.99 
While challenges to PLAN modernization and growth remain—including dif-
ficulties in systems integration and continued reluctance to collaborate at the 
research stage—the past decade has demonstrated that previous challenges have 
ended up being far from insurmountable.
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U.S. Navy PLA Navy
2015 3 24
2016 4 24
2017 8 19
2018 7 15
Total 22 82
TABLE 2
USN AND PLAN COMMISSIONS, 2015–18
Sources: USN data from Wikipedia; PLA Navy data from Meyer, China’s Maritime Forces.
The PRC has continued to make military spending a top national priority. In 
2019, China announced that it had raised defense spending by 7.5 percent, to 1.19 
trillion yuan (about 177.61 billion U.S. dollars).100 This demonstrates, again, that 
the PRC’s annual growth rate for defense spending continues to outpace the rate 
of increase in its gross domestic product (GDP), which for 2019 is estimated to 
have been 6.5 percent.101 The PRC’s GDP surpassed that of the United States in 
terms of purchasing power in 2014—with troubling implications for the future 
size, capability, and disposition of the PLAN relative to the U.S. Navy.102 
When it comes to the very important metric of how many ships actually are 
being built, launched, and commissioned, the PLAN continues to surpass the 
U.S. Navy. It is worth remembering that between 2013 and 2014 China launched 
more naval ships than any other country—a ranking it continued to hold through 
2019, as shown in table 2.103 
As table 3 depicts, by 2030 the PLAN surface force (including carriers, de-
stroyers, frigates, corvettes, missile-armed patrol craft, amphibious ships, and 
mine-warfare ships) could approach 450 hulls (up from 331 ships in 2015) and 
submarines could total 99 (up from 66 in 2015). However, considering the past 
four years of actual construction, even this 2015 “maximal scenario” may un-
derestimate the future growth of the PLAN. For instance, in 2015 Type 052D / 
Luyang III–class destroyer production barely had begun, and the launching of 
the first Type 055 / Renai-class cruiser was a year and a half in the future. An-
other way to understand PLAN growth is to look at the period between 2010 and 
2018, when twenty destroyers and four cruisers were launched from Chinese 
shipyards, whereas between 2000 and 2010 only ten destroyers and no cruisers 
were launched.104 
Considering all this new information, table 3 represents a “course correction” 
to the 2015 prediction, indicating that by 2030 the PLAN will consist of a surface 
force of over 450 ships and a submarine force approaching 110 boats. The biggest 
unknown will be the rate of decommissioning of those warships and submarines 
built before the turn of the 
century (such as the Type 
053 class of destroyers and 
the Type 035 class of diesel 
submarines).
LIMITING FACTORS
The size of the PLAN and the 
scope of its global operations 
in the future are not inevi-
table. There are two limiting 
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TABLE 3
PLA NAVY PLATFORM INVENTORY—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Sources: 2015 data from Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy; 2019 data from Meyer, China’s Maritime Forces; 2030 (old) data from Erickson, 
Chinese Naval Shipbuilding; 2030 (new) data from author’s calculations.
Note: Captain Fanell prepared his figures for presentation at the China Maritime Studies Institute’s “Going Global? The People’s Navy in a Time of Strategic 
Transformation” conference, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, May 2019. Subsequent to this conference, the Congressional Research 
Service published Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report 
RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 18 March 2020), table 2 of which is reproduced below. The CRS report generally reflects 
Captain Fanell’s original and updated 2030 estimates.
Platform
Inventory 
2015 2019 2030 (old  estimate)
2030 (new  
estimate)
Aircraft carriers 0 1 N/A 6
Cruisers 0 0 N/A 16
Destroyers 26 31 34 45
Frigates 52 52 68 55
Corvettes 20 42 26 45
Missile patrol craft 85 86 111 100
Amphibious ships 56 56 73 75
Mine-warfare ships 42 56 55 50
Major auxiliaries 50+ 50+ 65+ 60+
Total surface combatants 331+ 374+ 432+ 452+
SSNs 5 8–9 12 24
SSBNs 4 4–5 12 14
SSs 57 50–54 75 70
Total submarines 66 62–68 99 108
Total fleet size 397+ 436–
442+
531+ 560+
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Ballistic missile submarines 1 1 3 4 4 6 8
Nuclear-powered attack submarines 5 4 5 6 7 10 13
Diesel attack submarines 56 56 48 53 55 55 55
Aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers 19 25 25 26 43 55 65
Frigates, corvettes 38 43 50 74 102 120 135
Total China navy battle force ships,
including types not shown above
110 220 220 255 360 400 425
Total U.S. Navy battle force ships 318 282 288 271 297 n/a n/a
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Source for China’s navy: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed 
Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020– 
2030,” February 2020, 4 pp. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and 
used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. Figures are for end of calendar year. Source for figures for U.S. 
Navy: U.S. Navy data; figures are for end of fiscal year.
Note: n/a means not available.
NUMBERS OF BATTLE FORCE SHIPS, 2000–2030
FIGURES INCLUDE BOTH LESS-CAPABLE OLDER UNITS AND MORE-CAPABLE NEWER UNITS
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factors to the PLAN’s expansion that the United States and its allies can and must 
empower if they are to maintain dominance of the seas.
The first factor is the stability of the leadership of President Xi Jinping. Some 
have pointed out that Xi is facing “critical levels of political risk given the politi-
cal and economic problems in the regime.” Some believe that his constitutional 
amendments to remove term limits on the president suggest that a factional strug-
gle exists within the CCP. These observers further argue that Xi’s failure to hold a 
fourth plenum of the CCP’s current Central Committee on the normal schedule 
means that “the factional struggle is extremely intense and Xi is in grave danger.”105 
Second, some observers predict that the PRC’s economic growth is unstable, 
and even on the verge of collapse. These observers note that “China’s $34 trillion 
pile of public and private debt is an explosive threat to the global economy.”106 
Given this, the future growth and expansion of the PLAN could be slowed, if not 
disrupted, by purposefully impeding the country’s economy.
ASSESSMENTS, ACCURACY, AND ADJUSTMENT
As U.S. policy makers assess the speed and sustainability of China’s naval ex-
pansion, it is useful to look back on previous assessments of Chinese sea power. 
Whenever such a function has been performed, we should expect to find errors 
and misjudgments—assessments of the future are hard. However, in the case 
of China we find that the most notable feature of previous assessments is that 
all our misjudgments have been in the same direction—perfectly fitting the 
definition of systematic error. The urn of history is filled with the ashes of na-
tions, and navies, that suffered disastrous, if not cataclysmic, defeat by enemies 
who were able to achieve strategic surprise. This is why it is unacceptable that 
the majority of U.S. scholars and government analysts persistently have under-
estimated and downplayed the threat represented by the PRC and the rise of a 
global PLAN.
Former commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Robert F. Wil-
lard noted in 2009 as follows: “I would contend that in the past decade or so, 
China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capabil-
ity and capacity every year. They’ve grown at an unprecedented rate in those 
capabilities.”107 In 2011, the director of naval intelligence, Vice Admiral David 
J. Dorsett, stated that the PLA’s emerging military potentialities have “entered 
operational capability quicker than we frequently project.”108 The sad reality 
is that the U.S. Intelligence Community and academia have miscalculated the 
scope, scale, and timing of the PLAN’s modernization and its impact on U.S. 
national security.
One of the most important lessons to be learned is that the most accurate 
predictions of the PLAN are not derived just from what the PRC declares or 
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what a select few scholarly China hands interpret, but instead are created from 
in-depth and consistent observation of what the PLAN actually is building and 
where its ships and submarines are operating on a continuous basis. It is only 
by watching what China does with its navy—observing and recording its move-
ments every day—that accurate and timely projections can be made.
Additionally, it must be remembered that all individuals and groups who view 
such changes do so through a series of uniquely constructed “lenses,” based on a 
set of fundamental assumptions. As Eyer notes, “the record is clear: In each case 
of strategic military surprise, it can be demonstrated that when new information 
was presented, regardless of its pedigree or import, if it was found to disagree 
with the specific set of closely held assumptions that informed the thinking of 
those nations’ civil and military leaders, it was rejected.”109 
Because of this tendency, assumptions must be tested rigorously, and when 
new or inconvenient data do not fit into the existing “conventional wisdom” 
decision makers must step in and demand that the assumptions be challenged, 
and thrown out if found to be wrong.110 Only then will the risk of surprise be 
minimized. This is especially important when assessing catastrophic risks, 
such as a shift in the balance of military power from the United States to 
China. While many China hands proclaim the objectivity of their analyses, 
the validity of their claims must be tested against their track records. This is 
where policy makers must become more discerning—and ruthless—in their 
decision-making.
What does the future hold for the PLAN in the far seas? China soothes reas-
suringly that its “global military presence is not an attempt to gain a sphere of 
influence, interfere with the internal affairs of other countries, [or] invade foreign 
territories or disrupt regional order, but to assume more international responsi-
bilities and obligations according to its capabilities and play a more significant 
role in maintaining regional stability and world peace.”111 Yet there are indicators 
that this global naval presence will result in exactly what the world has witnessed 
in the South and East China Seas over the past decade, where PLAN forces have 
been used to bully and intimidate smaller and weaker nations into complying 
with Beijing’s dictates.
The risk of conflict at sea is not lessened by the existence of a global PLAN, 
one that has been charged to “fulfill its international obligations as a major global 
power.”112 To the contrary, China increasingly will threaten U.S. and allied interests 
abroad as its naval expansion allows it to do so. The United States will be forced to 
fight back, increasing the risk of major-power war. Given the PLAN’s decadelong ex-
perience operating in the far seas, the service’s operational and naval-construction 
trajectory, the PRC’s overall economic strength, and the regime’s established track 
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